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D I ' I
RE' I S LI I T
1 UTILITY AND PREFERENCES 
1. Overview 
When it comes to ζriticisms of Mill's utilitarianism. the distinction 
between the quality and the quantity of a pleasure is one of the most 
popular topics. Mill's statement of the distinction appears in the fifth 
paragraph of Chapter 2 of Utilitarianism. 
If 1 am asked what 1 mean by difference of quality in pleasures， or what 
makes one pleasure more valuable than another， merely as a pleasure， except 
its being greater in amount， there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures， 
if there be one to which al or almost al1 who have experience of both give a 
decided preference， irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it， 
that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is，むythose who are 
competently acquainted with both， placed so far above the other that they 
prefer it， even though knowing it to be atiended with a greater amount of 
discontent， and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure 
which their nature is capable of， we are justified in ascribing to the予referred
enjoyment a superiority in quality so far outweighing quantity as to render it， 
in comparison， of small account. (ch.2， para.5) 
Following this statement， Mill argues as follows: This distinction has 
a close relationshi予 with the manner of human existence. Men are 
capable of various pleasures; but those who know well two kinds of 
pleasures definitely prefer the one which is obtained by employing their 
higher faculties. Although a being with higher faculties needs more to 
make him happy， and he may evenεxperience more acute suffering 
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because of these faculties; but despite these liabilities， he can never wish 
to become a being with lower faculties. What explains this fact is a sense 
of dignity. All men possess this in some form， and they cannot be happy 
without satisfying this sense. Mill thus considered the interdependencies 
between pleasures， faculties， and the manner of happiness for human 
beings. 
Now， as was pointed out by many people already， there are indeed 
several problems in this argument of Mill's; and 1 am not going to defend 
his distinction between the quality and the 弓uantity of pleasures. 
However， despite some mistakes and confusions in Mill's argument， his 
argument also contains several important insights which cannot be 
ignored if we wish to develop a coherent theory of values on the 
utilitarian ground. In this paper， 1 wish to point out what these insights 
are， and to evaluate positively Mill's contributions to utilitarianism， 
taking also in view later development of utilitarian theories， such as 
Sidgwick's or contemporary writers's. 
(1) First， we have to notice that Mill introduced the notion of 
preference into his ethical hedonism. 
(2) Second， we have to notice that Mill is calling our attention， not 
only to the question of the quality of pleasures， but to a more 
fundamental question of how we make quantitative comparison of 
pleasures. He is treating， not only the comparison of different kinds of 
pleasures but also the very question of why pleasure is good and pain is 
evil; the latter is indeed the most fundamental question for the ethical 
hedonism. Let me quote羽il'swords on this point. 
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On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures， or which of 
two modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings. apart from its moral 
attributes and from its conse司uences，the judgment of those who are司ualified
by knowledge of both， or if they differ， that of the majority among them， must 
be admitted as final. And there needs be the less hesitation to accept this 
judgment respecting the司ualityof pleasures， since there is no other tribunal to 
be referred to even on the弓uestionof quantity. What means are there of 
determining which is the acutest of two pains， or the intensest of two 
pleasurable sensations， except the general suffrage of those who are familiar 
with both ? Neither pains nor pleasures are homogeneous， and pain is always 
heterogeneous with pleasure. What is there to decide whether a particular 
pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain， except the 
feelings and judg認entof the experienced ? When， therefore， those feelings and 
judment dec1are the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to ちe
preferable in kind， apart from the question of intensity， to those of which the 
animal nature. disjoined from the higher faculties， is susceptible. they are 
entitled on the subject to the same regard. (ch.2， para.8) 
(3) However，五tfil tends to confound theoretical problems of 
hedonism with practical problems which may arise when we try to a予ply
hedonism to our actual situations. That's the reason why his argument 
sometimes becomes hard to follow. 
(4) Confining our attention to the theoretical problems， why is it that 
we can say that the fact that people actually prefer this to that， 
establishes the value-judgment that this is more desirable than that? 
Mill's argument is not c1ear enough to answer this fundamental question; 
but it is still important in that it draws our attention to this question. 
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2. Preferences and a Theory of Value 
Let us discuss (1) and (2) of section 1 in more detail. What is the 
significance of担il'sintroduction of the notion of preference into the 
theory of ethical value? It is well known that Bentham treated the 
question of measurement of pleasure and pain， and he tried to establish a 
unified弓uantitativecriterion for ethical values (Bentham 1789， ch.4). He 
tried to show how to evaluate pleasures and pains in terms of such 
factors as intensity， duration， certainty， propinquity， or the number of 
people affected. However， Bentham's discussion leaves some fundamental 
problems untouched. 
The question of the value of a pleasure should be concerned not 
with the measurement of the strength of a sensation or feeling as a 
psychological state， but with the goodness or badness of its state; the 
question is evaluative， not factual. For instance， between the fatual 
statement“this pleasure had such and such an intensity and it lasted 
three minutes" and the evaluative judgment“this pleasure is good to such 
and such a degree"， there is stil a gap. Y ou cannot infer the latter from 
the former by logical inferenεe alone. Mill is certainly referring to this 
gap in our second quotation in the preceding section. The question of 
“the quantity" or “the 弓uality" of pleasures belongs to evaluative 
questions， not to factual or descriptive questions; and what connect a 
description to an evaluation are nothing but each individual's 
preferences. One's preferences determine an evaluative ordering of 
pleasures and pains， and this ordering determines their values: to what 
extent they are worth having. Thus， what is essential in the utilitarian 
calculation is not such a bunch of factors as was mentioned by Bentham， 
but people's preferences: what they prefer， what they dislike. This is 
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what counts whεn we have to consider the utility; and thus we have to 
know what people's preferences are. As 1 understand， this is Mill's 
message when he discussed the quantity and the quality of pleasures. 
1 wish to add that the theory of value which Henry Sidgwick - by 
far the most careful utilitarian in the 19th century --reached was a 
hedonistic theory along this line， which incorporated the notion of 
preference into the definition of pleasures. 
3. Theoretical vs. Practical Problerns 
Let us予roceedto the third point (3) of section 1， namely the 
distinction between theoretical and practical problems about preferences. 
In ethics， as well as in science， the confusion of these two kinds of 
problems produces futile discussions. Mill's arguments about preferences 
are not entirely free from this sort of confusion， and that may well be the 
reason why his arguments are sometimes hard to follow. As 1 have 
already pointed out， Mill's idea that the notion of preference is 
indispensable for any ethical theory， whether or not it is hedonistic， isan 
important theoretical insight which emended the defect of Bentham's 
original theory; and 1 think Mill was basically on the right track in this. 
However， Mill's argument in favor of the distinction of the qualities of 
pleasures in terms of experts's preferences seems to me to fal largely 
into the practical problems of how we should apply hedonism to concrete 
situations. If he wants to defend the distinction between the quantity and 
the quality of pleasures as a theoretical distinction of hedonism， his 
theory may produce a contradiction. So 1 will argue. 
時ow，at the common sense level， anyone will hardly doubt that we 
can recognize a “qualitative" difference between one kind of pleasure and 
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another kind. Thus， at this level， weεan agree with Mill that “it is better 
to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied"一一-a famous 
dictum of Mill's. And it seems that this judgment may be paraphrased as 
“a man's pleasure is qualitatively higher than a pig's pleasure". However， 
as 1 have already pointed out， this judgment is not a descriptive 
judgment but a value-judgment， an expression of our preference. Mill is 
well aware of this， and he presents the condition under which this sort 
of judgment can claim its validity， i.e. the agreement of a1 who know 
both; in Mill's own words，“of two pleasures， ifthere be one to which a1 
or almost al who have experience of both give a decided preference， 
that is the more desirable pleasure". However， here， it is of vital 
importance to distinguish the theoretical criterion from its actual 
applications. As 1 see the matter， Mill invited a number of 
misunderstandings and confusions by neglecting to draw this distinction 
clearly. 
The distinction itself is simple. When 担il said that， of two 
pleasures，“if one of the two is， by those who are competent1y acquainted 
with both， placed so far above the other" that is so far above in its value， 
he was putting forward a theoretical criterion for the εomparison of 
pleasures; and he in effect adopted the same criterion “the judgment of 
those who are qualified by knowledge of both" for the quantitative 
comparison of pleasures (see the second quoation in section 1). However， 
as regards two aribitrarily chosen pleasures， whether there are any who 
are competent1y acquainted with both (qualified by knowledge of both)， 
and even if there arεsuch people， whether their preferences are in 
agreement， we cannot determine a priori; these are factual problems with 
respect to practical applications of the preceding criterion. Further， as 
Mill himself was aware， if the preferences of those qualified with 
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knowledge of both do not agree， what should we do ? Whether or not we 
adopt a simple majority rule or any other， presumably supplemented by a 
reasonable conjecture， will also るelongto the latter problem. And 
whether or not we can obtain a definite ordering among various kinds of 
pleasures is also one of the problems of practical application of the 
criterion， the answer of which can be obtained only after we ascertain 
many facts. 話il was trying to answer al these different questions 
almost in one breath， and that caused many 出立たulties.
More specifically， when he argued that“it is better to be a human 
being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied 
than a fool satisfied"， this is really a conditional judgement which can 
only ーもe justified after we ascertain a number of facts with res 予ect to the 
appliεation of the criterion (Mill just took it for granted that we know 
both sides and have unanimous preferences). And what is crucial for my 
argument is that Mill's criterion does not contain in itself anything for 
distinguishing the q uantity and the弓ualityof pleasures or pains. After 
al， he stated merely that the qualitative superiority of pleasures d叩 ends
on the preferences of those who are competently acquainted with both， 
and he repeated the same criterion for弓uantitiativecomparison too. 
Thus he didn't state anything about how we should distinguish 
qualitative comparison from弓uantitativecomparison. Then， in order to 
make sense of Mill's criterion and argument， the only consistent 
interpretation seems to me to be this: the criterion for qualitative 
comparison is the same as that for quantitative comparison，ちutfor the 
case in which， either because of a great quantitative difference， or 
because of an obvious and definite agreement among people. one kind of 
pleasure is obviously superior to another， we may conveniently and 
practically distinguish the two kinds as “qualitatively different". This is 
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in fact my own interpretation. 1n short， qualitative superiority of one 
kind of pleasure over another is a distinction at the level of practical 
problems， not a theoretical distinction. 
4. Preferences and the J ustification of Value圃.Judgments
Finally， let us turn to the fourth and last point ((4) of section 1). 
Confining our attention to the theoretical problems， how can we justify 
the value-judgment that pleasure A is more desirable than B， by 
referring to the fact that those who know both A and B prefer A-to B? 
Unless we understand this point well， itis quite doubtful why we should 
appreciate Mill's insight. Let me explain how 1 see the matter in the 
following. 
First of al， we have to spell out in more detail Mill's criterion of 
unanimous preference of those who know both sides. If one does not 
know well the objects of comparison or preferences， we cannot say that 
his preference is rational. Further， although we can hardly expect that 
people's preferences are unanimous on many things， itwould not be so 
rare that different people agree in their preferences where they know 
quite well about the objects of preferences or expected results; on such 
an ideal condition， their preferences may well agree (because 
uncertainties， prejudices， and personal bias are excluded). 1n fact， on “the 
ideal observer" theory which has appeared 0εcasionally in the history of 
ethics， this ideal observer's preferences and value-judgments are 
sup予osedto be objective. 
Although the assumption of the ideal observer may be too strong as 
it stands， we may be able to adapt this theory to Mill's context， and we 
can adopt a far weaker condition. Suppose “むompetentacquaintance" 
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means that one is under no illusion， has enough information about the 
objects of preferences， and has actual1y experienced them and one's 
preference is rather stable; preferences under this condition may 
sometimes attain “objectivity"， i.e. an agreement of al1 those with 
competent acqaintanむe.For the sake of simplicity， let us cal1 a preference 
γαtional if it satisfies this condition (this notion of rationality is close to 
that of Brandt 1979， 10). 
And this gives a clue for answering to our question of justification. 
People's preferences or value-judgments may well be justified if they 
attain this sort of agreement among those with competent acquintance; i.e. 
if their preferences are rational. If their preferences agree to this extent， 
they will also agree in their value-judgments， which means they in fact 
accept these judgments. This provides a theoretical condition for 
justifying a value-judgment. The point is that preferences satisfying 
certain conditions (i.e. rational preferences)， not mere preferences， are the 
basis of justification. However， as a practical question， we are in many 
cases uncertain whether such conditions of preference are satisfied， and 
therefore we are not sure whether our value-judgment can be justified. 1 
have no doubt that説ilwas convinced that such justification of a value-
judgment was possible; what he said in his discussion of the quality of 
pleasures confirms this. However， as 1 have already pointed out， Mill was 
not clear about the distinction between the theoretical criterion and its 
practical applications， and that's why his arguments are sometimes 
confusing and even unintelligible. 
Since the problem of the justification of a value-judgment is very 
fre弓uentlymisunderstood， 1 wish to add the fol1owing comments. A very 
popular objection based on a misunderstanding is this:“Granted that 
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people's preferences somehow satisfy the condition of rationality， this is 
a mere fact about their preferences; and how could we infer a value-
judgment from this fact?" Against this objection， we have to first point 
out that one's value-judgment of goodness or desirability is an expression 
of one's preferences， not a mere description of a fact. Mill， as well as 
myself， would admit that there is indeed a gap between an expression of 
preferences and a description of facts. However， ifwe could ascertain the 
fact that people rationally prefer a certain thing and therefore they agree 
in their value-judgment (knowing the relevant facts)， this fact is a fact 
about their preferences， which does not hold unless they have those 
preferences (thus preferences are prior). And the fact that their 
preferences are rational means that these preferences agree and their 
value-judgment also agree; thus no more can be expected for the 
justification. We do not infer a value-judgment from a fact; rather the 
fact that those preferences hold establishes the value-judgment in the 
sense that people in fact acむept the judgment. The 予oint of my 
interpretation of Mill is that his condition of “competent acq uaintance" 
implies not merely an agreement of preferences (which may be a 
collective prejudice) but the rationa1ity of preferences. 
Next， one may raise the following question:“Y ou may be able to 
define the condition of rational preference as you like; but the real 
question is whether people can satisfy the defined condition." This is a 
quite reasonable question. However， recall立il argued that in several 
cases at least， such a condition is in fact satisfied， or at least 
approximately satisfied. Anせ aside from 担ill's examples， we can 
ourselves point out many examples of rational preferences (in our sense)， 
if we consider calmly. For example， in any society where private 
property is endorsed， no one wants to be robbed of a thing dear to him. 
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And people with sound common sense know quite well what is “ちerng
robむedof a thing" and what it is like to them or to others; and they 
unanimously dislike such a situation. Thus their preferences satisfy the 
condition of rationality as defined above. In addition， we can enumerate 
many examples where the condition of rationality is at least 
approximately satisfied: why murder is generally wrong (imagine the 
underlying preferences)， why a nuclear war is wrong， etc.， etc. Thus， if
the preceding question is meant to assert that our definition of rational 
preference is unrealistic， this may not apply. 
Finally， someone may raise this objection (which is in fact raised by 
an eminent commentator against me， when 1 presented the original 
Japanese version of this paper): To try to solve the problem of 
justification (or any other予roblemsfor utilitarianism) by assuming an 
“ideal observer" just begs the question; for， even though the予roblemmay 
ちesolvedザweassumεan “ideal observer"， no“ideal observer" may 
exist， and then everything collapses and you are simply begging the 
q uestion in terms of“ideal observer" ! 
However， this objection is another example of the confusion of a 
theoretical criterion and its practical application. First of al， we did not 
assume the full power of an“ideal observer" (maybe 1 should not have 
used this expression， since it invited this grave misunderstanding); we 
merely assumed rationality of preferences， in view of担il'sassertion. 
And even if we assume a stronger version of“ideal observer"， t主isdoes 
not beg the question， because whether or not there exist someone who 
satisfy the condition of rational preference， or the condition of an "ideal 
observer"， remains as an empirical question， and this is one of the 
essential parts of the a.搾licationof a theoretical criterion. An ethical 
problem is solved if a theoretical criterion for the solution is set，αnd we 
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obtαin a solution which in fiαct satisfies this criterion. Setting a criterion in 
terms of an “ideal observer" does not beg the question， since the 
condition is stil open. 
As 1 see it， the approach to the justification of value-judgments in 
terms of rational preference or rational choice is one of the major trends 
in the contemporary ethics (e.g.， Brandt 1979， Hare 1981， Harsanyi 
1977)， via Henry Sidgwick's older attempt. Mill's utilitarianism， although 
it may have been insufficient in many respects， was a starting point of 
this trend. and it contained al major issues of this trend. Whether this 
trend is promising is stiU under discussion; in particular， the notion of 
rationality with “お1information" (i.e.， with some element of an “ideal 
observer") is sometimes questioned， and people like H. A. Simon proposed 
the notion of “bounded rationality" (Simon 1997) as an alternative. 1 
should like to add that this important issue has a close bearing on the 
problem of justification. but that is a subject for another paper. 
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I DARWIN ON THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY 
1. The Continuity of Man and Anirnals 
Today， 1 wish to talk about Darwin's biological considerations on 
morality. There are other people who treated the same or the related 
problems in the 19th century， e.g. Spencer or Huxley; but it seems to me 
Darwin is by far the most important. When 1 began to study the 
Darwininan evolutionary theory some twenty years ago， 1 was very much 
impressed by Darwin's persistence with his thesis of the continuiか of
mαnαnd animals. In The Descent 01 Mαn， published in 1871 (2nd ed.， 
1874). this t註eSlsIS予utforward as follows [Q1]: 
It has， 1 think， now been shewn that man and the higher animals， 
especially the Primates， have somεfew instincts in common. All have the same 
senses， intuitions， and sensations，一一-similar passions， affections， and 
emotions， even the more complex ones， such as jealousy， suspicion， emulation， 
gratitude， and magnanimity; they practise deceit and are revengeful; they are 
sometimes susceptible to ridicule. and even have a sense of humour; they fel 
wonder and curiosity; they possess the same faculties of imitation， attention， 
deliちeration，choice， memory， imagination， the association of ideas， and reason， 
though in very different degrees. The individuals of the same species graduate 
in intellect from absolute imbecility to high excellence. They are also liable to 
insanity. though far less often than in the case of man. (Descent 01 Man， ch. 3) 
However， traditionally， there have been various sorts of arguments 
for regarding man as qualitatively distinct from any other animals; 
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man has the moral sense or conscience.. For instance， Rev. Leonard Jenyns， 
commenting on The 0行gin01 Species in a letter to Dawin， argues as 
follows [Q2]: 
One great difficulty to my mind in the way of your theory Is the fact of 
the exIstence of Man. 1 was beginning to think you had entirely passed over 
this question， til almost in the last page 1 find. you saying that“light wiU be 
thrown on the origin of man and his history." By this 1 suppose is meant that 
he is to be considered a modified and no doubt great1y improved orang! . . . . 
Neither can 1 easily bring myself to the idea that man's reasoning faculties and 
above al his moral sense could ever have been obtained from irrational 
progenitors， by mere natural selection --acting however gradually and for 
whatever length of time that may be required. This seems to me doing away 
altogether with the Divine Image that forms the insurmountable distinction 
between man andむrutes.(Letter to Darwin， Jan.4， 1860. Wilson， 1970， 351.) 
Thus Darwin had to face with the problem of how we can handle the 
moral sense within evolutionary processes， in other words， how we can 
give a biological explanation for man's moral faculties. This suちjectis 
tackled in chapters 4 and 5 of his book. 
2. Social Instincts 
Darwin's explanation of the origin of the moral sense is very 
interesting， but as is customary with his exposition， it is very 
complicated and hard to follow. But 1 think the main line of his argument 
may be reconstructed as follows: First， he puts forward the following 
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(H) "any animal whatever， endowed with well-marked social instincts， the 
parental and filial affections being hεre included， would inevitably acquire a 
moral sense or conscience， as soon as its intellectual powers had become as 
well， or nearly as well developed， as in man." (op. cit. ch. 4) 
“Oh， come on， this is a sheer counterfactual statement， and how 
should we justify such a statement ?" - no せoubtmany people may feel 
this way. But let's see what he means. Darwin means that this statement 
can be justified or made probable by what we know about man and 
social animals in general， ifwe supply evolutionary considerations. 
First. he reminds us of a fact that man is a social animal: human 
beings live in a family， in a group， and in a society; and this is a 
biological fact like that bees and ants live in a colony. And any social 
animal has social instincts which support their social life. By “social 
instincts" he means innate or genetic propensities“to take pleasure in the 
society of its fellows， to feel a certain amount of sympathy with them， 
and to perform various services for them" (ibid.). Since social instincts 
are part of the “essence" of a social animal， so to speak， these instincts 
persist and work continually in the whole life of any individual. But 
these instincts may work弓uitedifferent1y depending on what species 
that animal belongs to: in the εase of bees and ants， social instincts may 
determine particular jobs and roles an individual is to perform; but in a 
higher animal， social instincts may work as a mere tendency to prefer 
social life and to aid fellow members. 
Of course， itmay be asked why these animals have such instincts. 
Darwin has a ready answer to this: such instincts are useful for these 
animals， and therefore they have ac弓uiredthese by natural selection. But 
we have to notice here that the moral sense is not included in social 
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instincts at this stage of the argument. Darwin's purpose is to depict the 
process by which the complex faculty of rnoral sense rnay be developed 
frorn the cornbinations of sirnpler faculties of social instincts and 
intelligence， hopefully' by rneans of natural selection. Moreover， even if 
we admit his assumption that the social instincts are useful for the 
anirnals， there is stil a crucial problern: useful exact1y to whorn ? --to a 
group of anirnals or to 初出vidualanirnals? We will corne back to this 
problem later (Section 5). 
3. Conflicts of Social Instincts with Other Instincts 
Now， granted that rnan is a social animal， how has rnan aquired the 
rnoral sense? The second stage of Darwin's argurnent is concerned with 
an irnaginary psychologiむalprocess which rnay gi ve rise to something 
like rnoral sense or moral feeling. Suppose sorne social anirnal has 
acquired high intelligence so that it can rernernber past actions and 
motives. This will intensify the ability of sympathy which is included in 
the social instincts. Syrnpathy is an ability to re-present others' feelings， 
as well as one's own， within oneself; so that if this anirnal acquires beUer 
knowledge about others， by rneans of its irnproved intelligence， it is 
natural to suppose that the extent of sympathy wiI1 also be somehow 
widened. 
But Darwin is oot arguing that， since intelligence strengthens the 
operation of syrnpathy， the social instincts together with intelligence give 
rise to the moral sense. The matter is not that simple. We have to notice 
that the social instincts are not necessarily the strongest in each occasion 
when this anirnal rnakes decisions or actions， and they rnay give in to 
sorne other ternporarily stronger rnotives， such as appetites or sexual 
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drive. As we al know. we humans have anti-social or selfish motives as 
well as social motives; we often follow the former， and with higher 
intelligence we may even become cleverer for satisfying our selfish 
motives rather than social motives. Darwin is well aware of this. Then 
what would give rise to the moral sense ? 
The key is the enduring nature of the social instincts. The social 
instincts may give in to other stronger motives; but nevertheless， the 
social instincts are ever persistent. Then what would happen when these 
social instincts conflicted with other desires and were frustrated by 
satisfying the latter? As we know， when a certain instinct or desire 
failed to be satisfied， some sort of disagreeable feeling remains. And 
since the social instincts are enduring， each time this animal recall this 
conflict， this disagreeable feeling also recurs and it may be even 
intensified. Thus in memory， those feelings which are associated wIth 
social instincts would become dominant. Similar things would happen 
with agreeable feelings of satisfaction and enjoyment; if this animal 
followed the social instincts rather than other desires. its satisfaction 
would be recalled with enjoyment， because that is quite in conformity 
with its enduring social nature. And this is the beginning of the 
formation of moral feelings; and the ability to experience these feelings is 
an essential part of what we call the“moral senseぺ
[Note added in October 1998: This argument was already criticized in the 
19th century as trying to replace an evolutionary explanation of the origin of 
morality by a mere “imaginary psychology" (Shurman 1887， ch.5); and this 
crriticism seems to have some point. However， we can reconstruct Darwin's 
argument in two stages， (1) the evolution of a behavioral strategy， and (2) the 
evolution of psychological properties accompanying such a behavioral strategy. 
As regards (1)， the contemporary reader is already familiar with the 
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conditions under which an “altruistic" (or “conditionally altruistic") strategy 
can evolve and become dominant within a group. For instance， for reciprocal 
altruism， two conditions are necessary: (i) the same individuals must interact 
frequently， and (i) they must have 血emory in order to respond to an 
opponent's previous res予onse.We should notice that Darwin's conditions can 
cover these two; i.e.， sociα1 instincts imply fre司uentinteractions， and intelligence 
provides the memory needed for a wise strategy. 1 have shown， by a simple 
example， how a social and intelligent animal may acquire an altruistic strategy 
by natural selection (Uchii 1998). 
As regards (2)， itis quite natural to suppose that such aむehavioral
strategy needs some psychological makeup which supports it; in an animal 
with social instinct and intelligence， feelings， preferences， or propensities will 
accompany a behavior or a response to an opponent's action. And it is not 
difficult to imagine what sort of feelings are necessary for a reciprocal 
altruism， and this can be confirmed， to a considerable extent， by observing 
primates's behavior特使命 Waal1996). Thus， we can perfectly make sense of 
Darwin's original argument.] 
4. Social Norms， Sympathy， and Habits 
Darwin's emphasis on the persistent nature of the social instincts is 
illuminating. But his story is not over. Darwin next points out that high 
intelligence would be accompanied by the ability to use some sort of 
language， which would enable our animal to express their wishes or 
desires as a member of their community. Thus it is very likely that they 
come to form their social norms， or “public opinions" as to how they 
should do for the common benefit of the community. These norms or 
opinions are of course in an important sense “artificial" or 
“conventional"; and therefore these cannot be regarded as genetically 
determined. Darwin admits all this. But he emphasizes that “however 
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great weight we may attribute to pub1ic opinion， our regard for the 
approbation and disapprobation of our fel10ws depends on sympathy， 
which . . . forms an essential part of the social instinct， and is indeed its 
foundation stone" (op. cit.， ch. 4). His point seems clear: although the 
contents of norms and public opinions are determined largely by artifical 
factors， their binding force essentialy depends on a biologiεal factor， i.e. 
sympathetic ability， and this is instinctive or genetically determined. 
The importance of sympathy has been emphasized by many 
philosophers such as Adam Smith or H ume. But Darwin criticizes these 
philosophical views as follows: we have to understand sympathy not 
merely as a psychological ability to reproduce former states of pain or 
pleasure， but also as a biological instinct， which is a product of evolution. 
Only the latter characterization εan explain the fact that “sympathy is 
excited， in an immeasurably stronger degree， by a beloved， than by an 
indifferent person" (ibid.). This point is of course frequent1y mentioned 
by recent sociobiologists; but 1 wish to emphasizεthat Darwin was well 
aware of this， and he clearly saw its significance for ethics， a1though he 
was not clear about the biological mechanism which produces such 
tendencies. 
By now， the major part of Darwin's view on the genesis of the moral 
sense or conscience has been out1ined. Let me summarize his view with 
his own words [Q4]: 
At the moment of action， man wil no doubt be apt to follow the strongest 
impulse; and though this may occasionally prompt him to the noむlestdeeds， it
wiI1 more commonly lead him to gratify his own dsires at the expense of other 
men. But after their gratification when past and weaker impressions are 
judged by the ever-enduring social instinct， and by his deep regard for the 
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good opinion of his fellows， retribution wil1 surely come. He will then fel 
remorse. repentance， regret， or shame; . . . . . Hewil consequently resolve 
more or les firmly to act differently for the future; and this is conscience; for 
conscience looks backwards， and serves as a guide for the future. (op. cit. ch. 
4) 
1n short， his explanation of the genesis of conscience has the 
following features: (1) it analyzes conscience into a bundle of 
psychological dispositions and feelings; (2) these dispositions and feelings 
are products of evolution and therefore are instinctive， i.e. they have a 
genetic basis; and (3) because of this， the workings of conscience have 
some conspicuous limitations that the conscience regulates mainly actions 
toward closer people. 
The rest of his arguments is an elaboration of the preceding view. 
Darwin was a good observer. and it seems that this ability is well 
displayed in his remarks on the interplay between sympathy， pub1ic 
norms， and individual habits in morals. He argues that the preceding 
vlew lS弓uitein accord with w hat we know about undeveloped people. 
Among them， only strictly social virtues are esteemed， and self-regarding 
virtues such as temperance or prudence are rather neglected. Darwin 
seems to attribute the development of self-regarding virtues mainly to the 
improvement of intelligence and knowledge; but he is also aware of the 
importance of habits of individuals. As many moral philosophers have 
emphasized， virtues must be acquired as a habit; and a substantial part 
of habits may originate from individuals and spread within their groups， 
and sometimes beyond their. groups， by imitation. This is one of the 
essential features of what we call “culture". And such habits often 
strengthen and complement the workings of social instincts. Here， 
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biological process merges into cultural process. This is a very intriguing 
question， but we shall not get into this. 
5. Darwin on Group Selection and Kin Selection 
Now， what has Darwin accomplished by his argument so far? For 
the sake of argument， let us suppose that his explanation of the genesis 
of conscience is on the right track. But where does the principle of 
natural seleεtion play its role ? This stil is not quite clear. Since Darwin 
attributed the genesis of conscience mainly to two factors， (1) intelligence 
and (2) the social instinct， we wilI examine the two in this order. 
First， itseems quite clear that intelligence is developed by means of 
natural selection; because intelligence is no doubt useful to its possessor， 
an individual animal. So we can agree with Darwin's assertion， at least 
with respect to this factor. 
But what about the social instinct? The social instinct included 
sympathy， in particular， and sympathy played a crucial role in 
generating the moral sense or conscience. By means of sympathy， 
individual animals care for others and restrict their own selfish desires; 
in other words，αltruistic or moral tendencies originate from sympathy. 
Then naturally we have to ask: Is the social instinct including sympathy 
also developed by natural selection ? Darwin's attitude to this question is 
ambivalent; sometimes he seems to think that the answer is obviously 
'yes¥but at other times he seems to be aware of a grave difficulty.. But 
what exactly is this difficulty ? Let me explain. 
Let us recall how natural selection works. There are many 
individual variations which are hereditary among animals of the same 
species. And if some of these variations are more advantageous than 
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others in the struggle for existenむe，individuals with these variations 
gradually increase within the species， and they eventually become 
dominant in numbεr. Thus natural selection works in terms of the 
herediatηcharacteristics of individuals; and these characteristics m ust be 
useful primarily to their possessors， i.e. to individuals. But Darwin 
frequently speaks of moral faculties useful to a tribe or group of 
individuals， and he says that these faculties have been developed by the 
competition among such tribes or groups in their struggle for existence. For 
instance， he argues this way [Q5]:“When two tribes of primeval man， 
living in the same country， came into competition， if . . . theone tribe 
included a great number of courageous， sympathetic and faithful 
members， who were always ready to warn each other of danger， to aid 
and defend each other， this tribe would succeed better and con弓uerthe 
other" (ch. 5). Granted; but is this natural selection working on 
individuals? Darwin doesn't seem to think it is: for he is well aware of 
the difficulty as follows [Q6]: 
But it may be asked， how within the limits of the same tribe did a large 
numちεrof members first become endowed with these social and moral 
qualities， and how was the standard of excellence raiseせ?It is extremely 
doubtful whether the offspring of the more sympathetic and benevolent 
parents， or of those who were the most faithful to their comrades， would be 
reared in greater numむersthan the children of selfish and treacherous parents 
belonging to the same tribe. . . Therefore it hardly seems probable， that the 
number of men gifted with such virtues， or that the standard of their 
excellence， could be increased through natural selection， that is， by the 
survival of the fitest; for we are not here speaking of one triむebeing 
victorious over another. (ibid.) 
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Thus Darwin's program for explaining the genesis and development 
of morality by means of natural selection seems to have failed at a 
crucial point. That is to say， he tried to appeal to what we now call 
‘group selection' (i.e. an advantageous group survives and individuals of 
that group indirectly change). but he admitted that this group selection is 
not likely to be supported by natural selection working on individuals. 
However. it must be pointed out， to be fair to Darwin， that he was aware 
of at least one key for solving this difficulty. It is what we now call‘kin 
selection.' Just before discussing the development of moral facu1ties， 
Darwin argues for the development of intelligence by natural selection， 
and he briefly touches on this key. as follows [Q7]: 
If such men !i.e. intel1igent 訟en] 1εft children to inherit their mental 
superiority. the chance of the birth of sti1l more ingeneous members would be 
somewhat better. . . . Even if they left no children， .the tribe would stil inc1ude 
their blood relations; and it has been ascetained by agriculturarists that by 
preseγving and breeding from the family of an animal， which when slaughtered 
was found to be valuable， the desired character has been obtained. (ibid.) 
This idea could have been more developed and applied to the 
explanation of moral faculties; but Darwin left that job to the biologists 
in the 20th century， such as W. D. Hami1ton (kin selection) or Robert 
Trivers (reεiprocal altruism). What Darwin actually did instead was to 
appeal to the principle of heredity of ac弓uiredcharacters. 
6. The Significance of Darwin's Considerations on Morality 
In this talk 1 have outlined what 1 take as the essence of Darwin's 
???
?
ar in' ram l esi ent
orali ea f t r l t
i l i t. at , eal hat a l
' t ' . t i i al f
t i t ge), t itt t i l t s
t ik r t r l or i i i uals.
o ever, t ust i t, i ar i , t a ar
t t i i lt . t hat a l ' i
ti n.' t o ent f oral lt ,
ar i o e t f lige at r l l t ,
r o i , lo 7]:
f e . . t l t m ] left i erit eir ental
eriorit , f i f t ll or s e bers oul e
hat ett r, .. f ft i , oul till l e
ir s; t t ri ult rarists at
r rom il f al, hi he t r
a l l , si aract r s t i ed. i .)
i l or li
l t oral lti ; t ar i ft t i l gists
, . . a ilt i l t ) r obert
r c l ru s ). hat ar i t l i a
l i l f r i f acq i aracters.
. i i ica ar in' onsi erati oralit
I t n hat I f ar in'
- 112-
theory of morality. He was mainly concerned with the biological and 
psychological task of explaining the genesis of moral facu1ties of man. 
But it seems to me that he was also interested in moral philosophy based 
on the evolutionary theory. The major advocate of what is called 
‘evolutionary ethics' in the 19th century was of course Herbert Spencer; 
and Darwin was far more cautious than Spencer， trying to avoid any 
definite statements about what we ought to do. But now and then he 
criticizes former and contemporary moral philosophers， such as Adam 
Smith or lohn Stuart Mill， and sometimes even gets into issues of 
eugenics， in The Descent 01 Man. This indicates Darwin's strong interest 
in moral philosophy. Moreover， we have good evidence that this interest 
originates in his youth. For instance， 1 was surprised by finding the 
following remarks (written in Octoちer，1838) in his Notebooks [Q8]: 
Two classes of moralists: one says our rule of life is what will produce 
the greatest happiness.一-The other says we have a moral sense --But my 
view unites both & shows them to be almost identical. What has produced the 
greatest good or rather what was necessary for good at al is the instinctive 
moral senses: (& this alone explains why our moral sense points to revenge). In 
judging of the rule of happiness we must look far forward & to the general 
action - certainly because it is the result of what has generally been best for 
our good far back.一一一(muchfurther than we can look forward: hence our rule 
may sometimes be hard to tel). Society could not go on except for the moral 
sense， any more than a hive of Bees without their instincts. (Old & Useless 
Notes 30， Barret et al.， 1987， 609.) 
We may recall that the moral philosophers who emphasize the moral 
sense are called 'Intuitionists' and those who emphasize the greatest 
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c1aiming that he can synthesize these two major schools of moral 
philosophy! 1 will add， for your curiosity， that Henry Sidgwick， a great 
utilitarian and who c1aimed that Intuitionism and Utilitarianism can 
coincide， was born in the same year， 1838. And we have to notice also 
that Darwin's idea of the genesis of morality is already sketched in 
rough out1ine in the last sentence. 
But these historical interests aside， are there any significant 
suggestions for ethics or normative moral philosophy that can be 
exploited from Darwin's theory of the moral sense? 1 think there are. 
Since 1 do not have much time left， let me briefly touch on this without 
arguments. First of al， (1) we have to know well about human morality 
in order to make any normative assertions. And in this respect， the 
Darwininan view of morality is certainly useful. We have to construct 
feasible ethics for humans as a social animal， not for an angel or an 
isolated beast. For this purpose， we certainly have to know our biological 
capacity， limitations as well as potentialitiεs. 
Secondly， (2) if the Darwinian view is on the right track， we should 
take the continuity of man and animals more seriously. Darwin argued 
more or less persuasively that we humans and other animals share many 
properties， inc1uding intelligence， feelings and preferences. Hence， ifwe 
find some of these valuable and think that they should be protected by 
our morals， the same consideration should support similar treatments of 
animals， with the differencεof various degrees， of course. For instance， 
persons like Jane Goodall， knowing very well about primates， assert that 
our treatment for them should be improved; and this assertion may well 
be justified. 
Thirdly and finally， (3) the Darwinian view suggests a certain 
approach to ethics， say the Reductionist approach (1 borrow this word 
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from Parfit， who uses it in the context of the problem of personal 
identity; and Daniel Dennett also defends this approaεh， with respect to 
cognitive science， in his Dαrwin's Dαngerous Ideα， 1995). This is the view 
that al ethical concepts can be analyzed into more basic concepts w hich 
are not themselves ethical. ln other words， itis the view that concepts 
such as 'conscience' or ‘moral goodness' will be well understood only in 
terms of concrete workings of human faculties and feelings， without 
postulating any peculiar realm of moral value. This is exactly what 
Darwin has done in his theory of the moral sense; conscience or moral 
sense is so called because of its workings in a certain way， notちecauseit 
is related to some irreducible moral value. Since this position is very 
likely to be misunderstood， 1 will hasten to add a few explanatory 
remarks. 
By reductionism 1 do not mean that ethical or evaluative concepts 
can be reduced to factual or desむriptiveconcepts; this is what担oore
called ‘naturalism' and I do not support it. In order to be a reductionist 
in my sense， one need not be a naturalist. All one has to admit as an 
ethical reductionist is that morality can be related to a bunch of natural 
or conventional elements and their workings. Morality needs intelligence， 
but this intelligence does not come from any peculiar realm， devine or 
angelic. Morality needs some instinctive factors， but one can find similar 
factors in other animals. And， again， moral feelings and preferences have 
an origin in a non-moral animal world， and you don't have to suppose 
any peculiar ‘respect for the divine moral law¥All the factors necessary 
for full understanding of morality can be found in this world and the 
workings of its constituent parts. This is what I mean by reductionism. 
And I understand that Darwin is one of the most powerful advocates 
of this position， although very few people would regard him as a moral 
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philosopher. So， by emphasizing his contriちution to ethics as a 
reductionist. 1 should like to end mv talk. 
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Postscript 
This is a paper read for the session on 19th Century Biology， International 
Fellows Conference (Center for Philosophy of Science， Univ. of Pittsburgh)， May 20-
24， 1996. Castiglioncello. Italy唱 RobertButts was the commentator; his comments 
and questions from the floor mostly centered on what 1 didη't say in the paper， i.e. 
on the point how scientific knowledge of evolution and normative ethics are related. 
1 have worked out my ideas in my book (1996， sεe the preceding Bibliography); the 
essential idea is that日)evolutionarty biology can teach us what sort of sentiments 
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or preferences we have as part of our human nature， and (2) moral sentiments and 
preferences are among them. Since， as 1 see it， the justification of moral judgements 
can be made essentially in terms of our rational choice for satisfying our 
preferences (not al， but those that can survive criticisms by facts and logic)-
including moral preferences-一， evolutionary knowledge， unlike knowlege of 
general relativity or quantum mechanics， does contribute to our normative ethics. 
For a brief discussion of the justification of “ought" statements (prudential， moral， 
etc.)， see my paper“Comments on Prof. Ruse's View" in PHS Newslette久 No.19，Nov. 
1997 (http://www.bun.kyoto-u.ac.jp/phisci/Newsletters/newslet_19.html). 
Finally， 1 wish to thank Jerry Massey for teaching me de Waal's recent book 
(1996) on the origin of morality; 1 have supported my view by de Waal's 
observations in混y1997 and 1998 papers. 
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m SIDGWICK'S THREE PRINCIPLES AND 
HARE'S UNIVERSALIZABILITY 
1n this paper， 1 wish to draw the reader's attention to cεrtain 
similarities between Sidgwick's and Hare's view on what is called the 
‘universalizability of a moral judgment'; and， further， 1 wish to show that， 
despite these similarities， there are some important differences between 
them. While Sidgwick's principles may be al1 regarded as a kind of 
impartiality. Sidgwick insisted they are non-tautological; whereas Hare's 
universalizability is meant to be a logical thesis established on logical 
grounds. Contrary to our initial prejudice that Hare is c1earer than 
Sidgwick in many respects， itwill turn out that these differences show 
that Sidgwick's analysis is deεper than Hare's. 1 will substantiate this 
c1aim by showing that Hare's theory of critical thinking makes use of the 
evaluative予rinciplescorresponding to Sidgwick's three予rinciples.
1. Sidgwick's Three Principles 
It is well known that Henry Sidgwick propounded a version of 
utilitarianism based on the three self-evident principles and the 
hedonistic theory of the ultimate good. The three principles are: 
(1) The Princ争le01 ]ustice: this constrains the judgment of ‘right' or 
'ought' as follows:“whatever action any of us judges to be right for 
himself， he implicitly judges to be right for al similar persons in similar 
circumstances" (Sidgwick 1907， 379). 
(2) The PrinciPle 01 Prudence: this is related to the notion of the good 
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on the whole of a single individual， and is stated as follows.“Hereafter 
as such is to be regarded neither less nor more than Now";“the mere 
difference of priority and posteriority in time is not a reasonable ground 
for having more regard to the consciousness of one moment than to that 
of another" (381). 
(3)The Principle of Rαtionα1 Benevolence: this is about the universal 
good， i.e. the good of al individuals， and this principle is composed of 
two propositions: “the good of any one individual is of no more 
importance， from the point of view of the Universe， than the good of any 
other"; so that “as a rational being 1 am bound to aim at good generally， 
- so far as it is attainable by my efforts，一一-not merely at a particular 
part of it" (382; 1 prefer this formulation in this paper， because the two 
components are stated separately). 
One may notice that al mayちeregarded as a kind of impartiality， 
the object of impartial treatment being different in each case. However， 
we have to be careful. In stating these three principles， Sidwick is 
insisting that al the three are non-t，αutological， i.e. not provable on logical 
grounds alone and have some substantive content; and， further， that (1) is 
a substantive principle obtained from the consideration of a Logicαl 
Whole， whereas (2) and (3) are a substantive principle obtained from the 
consideration of a Mαthematical or Quantitative Whole (380-381). It is of 
vital importance for our interpretation of Sidgwick's three principles that 
we understand the exact implications of this assertion. 
2. Hare's Analysis of the Universalizability 
On the other hand. it is also well known that まichardM. Hare has 
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propounded another version of utilitarianism based on the logical 
properties of moral words and the requirement of rationality. The logical 
properties of moral words he mainly appeals to are: the 
universalizability and the prescriptivity of a value-judgement. Since the 
main point of this paper is concerned with the affinity and the difference 
between Sidgwick's three principles and the applications of Hare's 
universalizability， 1 shall ignore the prescriptivity， and concentrate only 
on the universalizaむility.Now， what is the universalizaちilityof a value-
judgment? 
Hare gives， as we shall shortly see， several kinds of explanation， but 
the essential content of the universalizability seems to be c1ear. He has 
been maintaining“that the meaning of the word ‘ought' and other moral 
words is such that a person who uses them commits himself thereby to a 
universal rule" (Hare 1963， 30). 'Universal' means that it does not 
contain any reference to an individual， such as a particular person， a 
particular time， or a particular spatial location. Thus， according to Hare， 
羽毛ought'-judgmentlike "He ought not to smoke in this compartment"-
although it is a singular judgment referring to an individual person‘he' 
(whoever it is)一一.depends on， or implies， another ‘ought' -judgment 
which does not contain anv reference to an individual， and hence can be 
expressed only in terms of universal quantifiers and universal words. 
But why does the word ‘ought' or any other moral (evaluative) word 
have this property of the universalizability? Hare gives the following 
reasons (roughly in a chronological order， as Hare's view develops). 
(1) First， an ‘ought'-judgment (and a value-judgement in general) 
must be made on a criterion; and this implies that if the same criterion is 
satisfied， the same judgment must be made. Thus as long as a value-
judgment is made on a criterion， itis implicit1y universal (Hare 1952， 
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ch.6). 
(2) Second， an 'ought'-judgment (and a value-judgement in general) 
must be supported by a reαson; and this implies that the same judgment 
must be made whenever the same reason holds. Thus there must be a 
universal ‘ought' -judgment behind the individual‘ought' -judgment (Hare 
1952， 176; Hare 1963， 21， etc.) 
(3) Third， an ‘ought' -judgment (and a value-judgement in general) has 
a descriptive meaning; and a descriptive meaning presupposes a universal 
rule which determines it. Although evaluative words and descriptive 
words differ in their essential function， they do share this feature as long 
as they have a desεriptive meaning as an element of their meaning (Hare 
1963， ch.2). And since the meaning-rule which governs the use of a 
descriptive term is a universal rule (dependent on the simila行t勿 of
objects in a certain respect)， a singular descriptive judgment is 
universalizable， and in the same way， a singular ‘ought三judgment(and an 
evaluative judgment in general) is universalizable (Hare 1963， 13). 
These are the major lines of arguments in favor of the 
universalizaもility.But our question is: are they right， or is any of the 
three reasons good enough to establish the universalizability ? 
3. Is the Universaliza説lityTrue on Logical Grounds ? 
Let us recall that Hare is trying to show the universalizability as a 
logical thesis: it is meant to be true on conceptual grounds alone， or true 
by virtue of the meaning of‘ought' (or any other evaluative word). Thus， 
if Hare is right， the universalizability is analytically true， given the 
meaning of‘ought'; or it can be established by the conceptual truth 
contained in the notion of ‘criterion' (sect.2， (1)) or ‘reason' (sect.2， (2)) or 
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‘meaning-rule for a descriptive word' (sect.2， (3). 
However， we also have to recall that Sidgwick insisted that al of his 
three principles are non-tautological (see Okuno 1998， 6.2). One of the 
easiest interpretation of his Principle of Justice (sect. 1， (1))， for instance， 
is that it merely expresses the universalizability of ‘ought' or ‘right 
action' (1 myself endorsed this interpretation for sometime). But if Hare is 
right， this interpretation makes the Principle of Justice a tautologous or 
analytically true principle， and Sidgwick persistent1y tried to avoid such 
a principle for his ‘self-evident' principles for ethics. Then it is obvious 
that both cannot be right; so which is wrong， Sidgwick or Hare ? 
Actually， 1 once argued (a long time ago， U chii 1974) that Hare is 
wrong; and although 1 have not changed my mind， 1 now see the reason 
more clear1y why he is wrong， because 1 have now realized the important 
differences between Sidgwick's three principles. Let us first concentrate 
on the universalizability of 'ought¥ 
No one wiU deny that an ‘ought¥judgment has a criterion. No one 
will deny that an‘ought¥judgment must be made on some reason. And， 
again， no one will deny that an ‘ought¥judgment has a descriptive 
meaning. However， it is not so obvious that the criterion must be 
universal， in the sense that it does not contain any reference to an 
individual. Likewise. it is not so obvious that the reason must be 
universal in the same sense. And， finally， itis not so obvious that the 
descriptive meaning must be explicable without any reference to 
indi vid uals. 
Since Hare seems to be εmphasizing the universalizability as thε 
common property between descriptive judgments and value-judgments (in 
Hare 1963)， let us consider the descriptive meaning of a descriptive 
judgment. such as 
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(1) This is one meter long. 
1 presume no one will question that this is a descriptive judgment. 
Indeed， Hare (1955) mentioned ‘one meter long' as an exam予leof a 
uni versal ex予ression(Hare 1955， 30()). But how can we explain the 
descriptive meaning of ‘one meter long'? You know that the unit of the 
length ‘met~r' was determined historically， and there is the standard of 
'meter' in Paris. Thus， 'this is one meter long' means that the length of 
this is identical or at least approximately identical with that standard; 
more specifically， itwould mean that ‘if this is transported to Paris and 
compared with the standard， the two will coincide'. As豆arerightly 
points out， any descriptive word depends on the similarity or the identity 
of this sort， and we can say that 
(2)αnything similar to the Paris standard in the relevant respect (i.e. 
the length) is‘one meter long'. 
This statement certainly has a universal form， and it defines an open 
class. But the syntactical form of universality is only a necessary 
condition for the universalizability; and likewise an open class may not 
correspond to the extension of a universal word， since you can define an 
open class by referring to an individual， as is the case with ‘a citizen of 
the United States'. 
Notice that， with the last example， we can construct a similar 
statement to (2) as follows: 
(3)αnyone similar to John F.五ennedyin the relevant respect (i.e. 
nationality) is ‘a citizen of the United States'. 
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This statement also has a universal form， but no one will deny that it 
(implicitly) contains an essential reference to an individual (the United 
States). Thus it is clear a statement with a syntactically universal form 
may not be properly or semαntically universal. 
And (2) is such an instance as containing a reference to an 
individual. 1 know Hare claimed that the expression ‘similar to X' can be 
replaced with a universal word (Hare 1955， 306-7; 1963， 11) even if X 
is a singular expression; but his claim is without a proof， and refuted by 
our example (3). May 1 also point out that the Paris standard is a unique 
individual? Now， can we eliminate from (2) the reference to the Paris 
standard? Y ou might think that the reference is inessential because you 
can substitute a reference to another standard (many countries have 
their own copies of the standard); but you must recall that such 
substitute standards work as a standard precisely because of their 
connection with the Paris standarせ and(2) is an instance of what 
Reichenbach called a ‘coordinative definition'， a definition correlating a 
concept to a particular object (Reichenbach 1958， 14勺.
*Reichenbach 1958. 14: 
Physical knowledge is characterized by the fact that concepts are 
not only defined by other conεepts， but are also coordinated to real 
objects. This coordination cannot be replaced by an explanation of 
meanings， it simply states that this concept is coordinated to this 
particulαγ thing. . these first coordinations are therefore 
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1 know that more recent methods of determining a meter are more 
comがicatedand refer to the wave length of a spectrum of a certain atom 
or of light; stil， unless these complicated methods retain their reference 
to the original standard， the meaning of‘meter' will change. But we do 
not have to get into messy details. The point here is that the meaning-
rule w hich determines the meaning of‘meter' did historiεally contained a 
reference to an individual， and nothing was wrong， logically， with this 
meaning・rule;statement like (2) is not semantically universal， because it 
contains an essential reference to an individual， but it works perfectly 
well as a rule for determining the meaning of a descri ptive word. This is 
a convention indispensable for makiηg 'meter' a universal word; thus a 
meaning-rule for a descriptive word is not as simple as Hare supposed. 
4. The Weak and the Strong Universalizability 
Let me distinguish the weαk universalizαbiliか from the strong 
universalizαbility (a1though the words sound very similar， my distinction 
is quite different from Gibbard's 1988， 59・60本 as 1 see it， his 
distinction is rather concerned with weights of preferences， whiむhwill be 
discussed in the suむsequentsections 5， 6， and 7). 1 will agree with Hare 
that a descriptive or evaluative word (having a descriptive meaning) is 
universa1izable in the form of (2)， and 1 wil1 call this the weak 
universalizability. And if we can eliminate al words containing a 
reference to an individual (e.g.， the Paris standard)， or if we can re予lace
al such words with proper1y or semantically universal words (i.e.， words 
with no reference to individuals)， 1 will cal1 this the strong 
universa1izability. Then， my point can be expressed in a word; namely， 
the logic of a descriptive word does not necessarily demand the strong 
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A moral statement， Hare says， isan overriding prescription that 
is universalizable: thεprescriber must stand ready to prescribe the 
same thing no matter what position he is to occupy. . 
Weak universality requires only that 1 prefer a1 told the same 
a1ternative for any position 1 might occupy. It does not re司uirethat 
my preferences a1 told be equally strong for each of those positions. 
1 can care what position 1 occupy， so long as 1 do not care enough to 
reverse the direction of my preferences a1 told. It， on the other 
hand， a person's preferences a1 told are position-independent in 
strength as well as direction， then 1 shall call them strongly un作ersal.
If we grasp this point， the rest of my argument is quite easy. The 
existence of a criterion for a desεriptive or evaluative word does imply 
the weak universalizability， but not the strong universalizability， because 
the criterion may contain a reference to an individual. The existence of a 
reason for a value-judgment does imply the weak universalizability， but 
not the strong universalizability， because the reason may contain a 
reference to an individual. Thus， if we wish to assert the strong 
universalizability of a value引ldgment，we need mo柁 thanthe logic of a 
descriptive meaning， more than the logic of a criterion， more than the logic 
of a reason (1 pointed this out in Uchii 1974， but 1 did not know 
Sidgwick well then). Thus， although Sidwick may not have known the 
modern logic， his intuition was 弓uiteacute. When he asserted his 
Principle of Justice is not tautologous， he was basically right. The strong 
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universalizability of ‘ought' or ‘right' has some substantive content， not 
provable by logic alone. 
There remain the following questions: Then， (a) is ‘ought' 
universalizable in the strong sense， (b) and if it is why? But 1 wil1 not 
pursue these questions here. Al1 1 wish to point out is that if you want to 
give an affirmative answer to the first question (a)， you have to defend 
your answer on a stronger assumption than Hare's; the fact that many 
people admit the strong universalizability of ‘ought' does not establish 
that it is a logical thesis. Some may wish to appeal to the concept of 
morality (e.g.，ちyasserting that at least‘moral ought' is universalizable)， 
and others may admit that the strong universalizability (with respect to 
evaluative words) is itself a suちstantiveethical principle， despite its 
formal and abstract character. But in either case， its justification is 
needed. Notice that， even if we make the universalizability true by vitrue 
of the meaning of ‘moral'， we thereby import another substantive 
question， 'why should we be moral ?' T主us，although many of us are ， 
unlike Sidgwick， unhappy with an appeal to‘self-evidence'， Sidgwick's 
claim that the (strong) universalizability of ‘ought' is non-tantologous 
seems stil correct. 
5. Universalizability and the Concept of Good 
Let us get back to Sidgwick's Principles. In addition to the Principle 
of Justice， Sidgwick mentioned two other， i.e. the Principles of Prudence 
and of Rational Benevolence: and he claimed that none of them are 
tautologous. Whereas Hare seems to have derived， in effect， in his Moral 
Thinking (1981) by means of the logic (the prescriptivity and 
unlvξrsalizability of an evaluative judgement) and the facts of the case in 
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question what these Principles have accomplished; thus leading to his 
version of utilitarianism. But as we have already seen in the last section， 
the strong universalizability (Hare clearly suるscribesto this) is not 
tautologous (analytic) and has some substantive content， and in this 
respect Sidgwick was right. This raises a strong doubt about the validity 
of Hare's‘derivation' of his own version of utilitarianism. But we will 
first examine Sidgwick's view. 
To begin with， why does Sidgwick need two more Principles in 
order to give the basis of utilitarianism? Let me quote one of the 
relevant passages from The Methods of Ethics (Sidgwick 1907) at length， 
because this is very important: 
The principle just discussed， which seems to be more or less clearly 
implied in the common notion of ‘fairness' or ‘equity'， is obtained by 
considering the similarity of the individuals that make up a Logical Whole or 
Genus. There are others， no less important， which emerge in the consideration 
of the similar parts of a Mathematical or Quantitative Whole. Such a Whole is 
presented in the common notion of the Good --or， as is sometimes said， 'good 
on the whole' - of any individual human being. (380.1) 
Sidgwick is first trying to explain why the Principle of Justice 
(roughly， the strong universalizability of ‘ought') is not tautologous. His 
reason is not quite clear， but he seems to be suggesting that， although it 
is logically possible to treat different1y different individuals making up a 
Logical Whole (humans， in this case)， our reason dictates to treat them 
similarly， if their situations are similar; and that this dictate is self. 
evident， although it is non-tautologous. Then， Sidgwick turns his 
attention to another kind of羽Thole(called Mathematical or Quantitative 
Whole)， and points out that one's Good on the Whole is such a 
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Quantitative Whole. He then continues: 
The proposition 'that one ought to aim at one's own good' is sometimes 
given as the maxim of Rational Self-Love or Prudence: but as so stated it does 
not clearly avoid tautology; since we may define ‘good' as ‘what one ought to 
aim at.' If， however， we say ‘one's good on the whole'， the addition suggests a 
principle which， when explicitly stated， is， atany rate， not tautological. (381) 
It should be clear that Sidgwick is carefully trying to avoid a 
tautologous principle. And recall that the Principle of Prudence is stated 
as:“Hereafter as such is to be regarded neither less nor more than Now'¥ 
This prescribes how we ought to treat different parts of one's good on 
the whole; and Sidgwick is pointing out that the last notion is not a 
Logical Whole but a Quantitative Whole. Many readers may be puzzled 
by this distinction; is‘good' so different from ‘ought' or ‘right' ? Yes， it
is， and 1 will explain the difference on behalf of Sidgwick (judicious 
Schneewind 1977 is not of much help on this point; see 298-300). 
Whether or not an act is right， whether or not you ought to do it， is
a two-valued distinction; there is no middle-road option， such as 'this act 
is a-half right'， so that it is not a quantitative distinction which allows a 
difference of degree. And Sidgwick is saying， in the Principle of Justice， 
that such a distinction should equally apply to any two individuals 
similar in the relevant respect. On the ot註erhand， whether something is 
good for me is c1early a matter of degree，‘good' being essentially a 
matter of comparison; moreover， Sidgwick is committed to the view that 
one's good on the whole must be composed of one's particular good 
experienced at each moment. Sidgwick distinguishes‘ultimate good' from 
‘good as a means' and he is talking here about the former. By introducing 
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the notion of ‘one's good on the whole'， Sidgwick is drawing our attention 
to the relation of parts to the whole and the relation of parts to other 
parts. Notice that such a relation brings in new problems which do not 
arise in the rightness of an action: how should on，e compare one goodお
another， and" how should one reflect the comparative value of one good into the 
uαlue of the whole good ? 
This problem is quite independent from the (strong) 
universalizability of ‘ought' or rightness. To see this， you need only to 
imagine the following sort of cases: Suppose you assign a higher value to 
any of your particular goods according to the c10seness of them to the 
present moment， now. A1though this is quite contrary to the Principle of 
Prudence， this choice (conceived as an action) can satisfy the 
universalizability， as long as you continue to prescribe consistently the 
same choice to yourself (in earlier and later moments) and others:‘Since 
this choice is right for me now， itis right for me at other moments， and 
for anyone at any moment' (notice that‘now' in this judgment can be 
expressed by a universally quantified time variable). Of course such a 
choice makes the determination of the value of good on the whole awfully 
difficult (if possible at al， and you may need another principle for 
summation); but again， this has nothing to do with the universaliza缶詰ity
of rightness. 
For the sake of comparison， let us examine the same problem from 
Hare's standpoint. Hare applies the universalizability to goodness (and to 
any other evaluative concept). But we have to be careful not to 
overestimate the extent of its application， in view of Sidgwick's analysis. 
For a while we will ignore the distinction between ‘ultimate good， or 
good in itself' from ‘good as a means'， since this distinction is not central 
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in Hare. Now， if1 say 
(1) this is a good philosophy book， 
1 am committed to 
(2) any philosophy book similar to this in the relevant respect is 
good， 
according to the (strong) universalizability; although 1 think the (strong) 
universalizability applied to goodness is stil non-tautologous if 'the 
relevant respect' is taken toちeuniversal， 1 shall ignore this point. Now， 
if‘good' is a comparative notion (no one will deny this)， and if it is further 
a quantitative notion (comparability does not necessarily imply this， 
bεcause a merξordεring is insufficient for prod ucing a measure of 
goodness)， the universalizability is 弓uiteincompetent to im予oseany 
restriction on such a comparison or a quantitative measure. 
Soppose 1 wish to make a ranking list of philosophy books 1 have 
ever read. Does (2) impose any restriction on such a ranking? Yes， it
does， but very litle. For， whatever criterion 1 may be adopting for 
evaluating philosophyちooks，(2) implies merely that if the same criterion 
is satisfied， 1 have to call a book ‘good'; it does not teach where 1 should 
insert thatるookin my ranking list. If you think (2) can do more， you are 
implicitly adding something more to the universalizability. For instance， 
it mayちesupposed that the criterion for the evaluation does戸ovidea 
clue how to grade a philosophy book; but the universalizability merely 
says ‘the same condition， the same grade'， and does not tel anything 
about how 1 shoud grade - this already presupposes a sort of 
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compαrative or quαntitative notion of goodness. Thus， it seems this 
consideration confirms Sidgwick's distinction. Any criterion of goodness， 
slnce ‘good' is a comparative or often quantitative notion， must refer to a 
method of ordering or grading， in addition to specifying the relevant 
respects for evaluation.‘Ought' and ‘right' need only the latter. 
Hare may be able toちringin preferences for laying down a criterion 
of comparison of goodness or a (quantitative) measure of goodness. 
However， it is not clear at al how the (strong) universalizability may 
help for determining such a criterion based on preferences. In particular， 
when we have to determine the goodness of aむook1 read in the past in 
comparison with another book 1 read now， the preceding problem of 
comparing a past good (preference) with a present good (preference) 
appears in Hare too. That is exactly the reason why he avoided 
discussing the problem of the ‘pure discounting of the future' (i.e.， giving 
less weight to future preferences; see Hare 1981， 100-101). If the 
universalizability can solve this problem， why didn't Hare do that? And 
if Hare claims pure discounting is irrational， Hare is not different from 
Sidgwick. 
6. Universalizability and Benevolence 
Next， let us turn our attention to the Principle of Rational 
Benevolence. While the Principle of Prudence is related to one's good on 
the whole， Rational Benevolence is related to the good of all individuals 
(taken together). Its point is that a person's good should be treated 
equally with another person's gooιif their amount is the same. That this 
Principle is independent of Prudence is clear， since the equality of weight 
through time in one individual's good does not say anything about weights 
-132-
a t a ti t t f dness. , t s i
si r t rm i ick' i t . r f nes ,
i ' d' parati r f antit t t , ust r
et f ng, it i t
t l ati . ' ' ' ' l tt .
ar l b n r f r ri
parI f es antit t ) easur f odne s.
eve , t t r t ll w ro ) iversalizabilit a
i r f ces. art l r,
i es f b I ast
pari it t I w, i e f
pari st ) it r t e)
r ar . at actl i
n em f ' r i t f t re' i ., i
ei t es; ar , - 01). f
i ersali abili i lem, i n't ar t
ar aim t o l, ar t i t om
i .
. niversalizabili e evol
e t, t r ri i l f ati al
enevolence. hil ri i l f e'
hol , ati l enevol f ll i i al
tak t er). t i t t r n' l
al it t r n' d, if ir ount e. hat i
r i l n t f , ualit f ei ht
hrou im d ' t t t eights
-
of dψC"ent individuαls when we have to consider their good taken together. 
Sidgwick says as follows: 
And here again， just as in the former case， by considering the relation of the 
integrant parts to the whole and to each other， 1 obtain the self-evident 
principle that the good of any one individual is of no more importance， from 
the point of view (if 1 may say so) of the Universe， than the good of any other; 
unless， that is， there are special grounds for believing that more good is likely 
toむerealised in the one case than in the other. (Sidgwick 1907， 382) 
It is clear that Sidgwick is appealing to the notion of a Mathematical 
or Qunatitative Whole， this time that of the universal good (on the 
whole). It should be clear by now that his Principle of Benevolence is 
also independent from that of Justice or the strong universalizability， and 
further， is non-tautologous. For， the universalizability has nothing to do 
with a 司uantitativemeasure， and it is logically quite possible that 
someone's good is weighted twice as much as another's good; notice that 
if you take the Egoistic method in Sidgwick's sense， you are giving a 
dominant weight to your own good. But Sidgwick is saying that 
rationality demands， if we take the point 01 view 01 the Universe， to give 
equal weight to everyone's good; and thus the Principle is non-
tautologous. This conditional character of the Principle of Benevolence is 
amply made clearむyOkuno (1998b， 7.1.3， 7.3)， and because of this 
conditional character， this Principle is consistent with that of Prudence 
(thus my comment on these principles in Uchii 1988， 220 is wrong). 
Although Sidgwick's distinction between a Logical Whole and a 
Quantitative Whole appeared somehow abrupt1y and its significance was 





iff t d a si r ir t .
i lo s:
r , st er , si eri l t f
t rt hol t r, I t i l i nt
i l t f o i i al s f or port , o
i t f e if I a ) f niver , f t er;
l , t , cial s r l i at or s l
b t er. i , )
t t i eal t f athematical
unatit t hol , i im t f i ersal
hole). t l r w t i ri i l f enevol
n t rom t f st r ro i ersali abili ,
h , -t t s. , i ersalizabilit t i
i q ntit eas , t i ll it ssi l t
eone' ei t i u other' d; ti t
goisti et i ick' , i
i a t ei t d. ut i i I t
li , i t of e of ni , I
l ei t r ne' ; ri i l s -
a o s. i dit al r ct r f ri i l f enevol
pl a b , . . , . ), s f i
dit l r t , i ri i l nsist t it t f r
h ent r i l chii , rong).
l i ick' i ogical hol
uantit t hol o o l i c a
t , t t t port r at r
-133 -
ethics. 1 must confess that although 1 knew Sidgwick these twenty years， 
1 have been trying to interpret him mainly in terms of Hare's 
universalizability. J. B. Schneewind likewise asserts that al the 
inferences re弓uiredby the three principles are generalizing inferences， 
the reason thereby prohibiting us to take arbitrary differences into 
consideration (1977， 300-302). Another interpretation in terms of 
application of fairness appears in Shionoya (1984， 156・7;he confounds a 
Quantitative Whole with a Logical Whole). However， al such attempts 
miss the real significance of Sidgwick's distinction between Logical and 
Quantitative Whole. 1 realized this only last year， as a byproduct of my 
study of the philosophy of space and time and reading some of 
Harsanyi's papers on social-welfare function (Harsanyi 1976， 1977， 
1982). Space-time philosophy suggested the conventionality of 
simultaneity and the geomεtrical structurεgiven a space-time manifold， 
it is stil a long way to determine its metric structure and we need to 
introduce many assumptions such as the unit of length， the method of 
measurements， the definition of simulaneity， etc. Similar things may well 
happen in ethics; e.g.， givεn one's goods at particular moments， we stil 
need a principle to form one's good on the whole; and likewise， given the 
good of each individual， we stil need a principle to form the good of al 
individuals taken together. Harsanyi has shown， more technically. how to 
do this， although there stil remain difficult problems in order to reach 
the usual maximization principle of the sum of individual utilities. 
Sidgwick was addressing himself to this sort of problem. 
In order to illustrate further the importance of Sidgwick's 
distinction. 1 will criticize in the next section Hare's ‘derivation' of 
utilitarianism， in the light of Sidgwick's insights. 
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7. Hare's Implicit Use of EvaIuative Principles 
1 will first summarize briefly Hare's‘derivation' of a utilitarian 
conclusion from the facts of any given case via the logic of evaluative 
words， in his Moral Thinking (1981). 1 put the word ‘derivation' within 
quotes because it Is not a straightforward logical inference from 
premisses to a conc1 usion; rather， his ‘deri vation' means that if one (1) 
tries to decide ratiot.κtly what one ought to do in the given case， (2) 
knowing al the fiαcts and (3) following out the logic of moral judgmenお，
then one willαccett a certain ‘ought' -judgment， and (4) this ‘ought' 
prescribes an act which maximaizes the satisfaction of preferences of al 
tersons involved in the case. As is well known， Hare distinguishes the 
critical thinking from the intuitive thinking in moral discourse， and 1 am 
here talking only about the critical thinking (which assumes full 
rationality and sufficient information; 1 will touch upon the予roblemof 
rationality later). Despite the criticism 1 am going to put forward in the 
following， 1 stil ap予reciateHare's method for justifying an evaluative 
conclusion in this manner， leaving the gap between Is (description) and 
uugut (universalizable prescription) as it is. 
Let us begin with his sim予lestmodel case， the car-biεycle example 
(Hare 1981， 6.2). Adam wants to park his car but Eve has put her 
bicycle in the only vacant parking lot; Adam prefers to park， whereas 
Eve prefers her bicycle to stay where it is. but it is assumed that Adam's 
preference is stronger than Eve's (this presupposes the interpersonal 
comparison of preferences). Assuming， further， that Adam has perfect 
knowledge about al this， and he is ready to decide what he ought to do 
by critical thinking， what ought he to do? Hare answers as follows: 
Since Adam wants to decide what he ought to do， by 
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universalizabiliち， he m ust seek an ‘ought' -judgment which is acceptable 
even if Adam's position and Eve's position are reverseせ;thus if he is to 
accept 
(a) Eve ought to move her bicycle in order to enable me to park 
there 
he m ust be ready to accept 
(b) If 1 were in her position， 1 ought to move my bicycle. 
But for this， he mustわtOwwhat it is to bein Eve's position with her 
preferences， because the proposed act will frustrate some. of her 
preferences; and because a rational decision must be made in the light of 
knowledge and logic. Further， this knowledge in the context of critical 
thinking satisfies what Gibbard (1988， 58) named the Conditional 
Reflection PriηciPle:‘1 cannot know the extent and quality of others's 
sufferings and， in general， motivations and preferences without having 
equal motivations with regard to what should happen to me， were 1 in 
their places， with their motivations and preferences' (Hare 1981， 99). 
Hare regards this as a conceptual truth (by virtue of ‘know' in the moral 
context). In short， Adam has to represent Eve's preference for unmoved 
bicycle within himself by his own acquired preference equal in strength 
with hers; this preference is a consequence of his knowledge， by the 
Conditional Reflection Principle. 
Then， the problem for Adam is now reduced to a rational decision as 
regards his own coηiflicting preferences. And since if his own two 
preferences conflict the stronger wins， a rational or prudential choice is 
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to satisfy the stronger (here，‘rational' roughly means that the choice 
survives theむriticismin the light of logic and sufficient knowledge). And 
the same solution applies in our case too: since Adam's original 
preference is assumed to be stronger than Eve's preference now 
represented by Adam's acquired preference， the rational solution is to 
choose an ‘ought¥judgment which satisfies (maximaizes the satisfaction 
of)Adam's overall preference (everything εonsidered)， in this case (a). 
Thus the ‘ought' -judgment is justified in terms of a rational acceptance 
based on facts and logic. 
This solution seems very attractive. Un1ike Sidgwick， Hare seems to 
have dispensed with the notion of ‘one's good on the whole' or of 
‘people's good on the whole'， thereるyavoiding Sidgwick's‘Quantitative 
Whole'. However， on a closer examination， similar problems reap予ear(l 
was stil unaware of this in my 1994). First， even in the case of 
intrapersonal comparison of one's own preferences， the comparison is not 
always among contemporaneous preferences， often involving conflicting 
preferences ranging over different times; the 号uestionof prudence will 
lose much significance if we may restrict our attention only to 
contemporaneous preferences! What is most1y at issue is the problem of 
diachronic rationality， requiring the comparison of preferences at 
different times. Hare is of course aware of this problem; that's why he 
S手entmany pages (Hare 1981， 101-106， 124) for discussing ‘now-for-
now' and‘now-for-then' and ‘then-for-then' preferences， emphasizing that 
‘there are obvious analogies between other people's preferences and our 
own preferences in the future' (124). This clearly shows that， although 
Hare did not use the notion of ‘one's good at a moment'， Sidgwick's 
problem for prudence (rational self-love) reappears in a different form in 
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Hare's theory too. And in view of Sidgwick's discussion， the essential 
problem is: how to weigh the im知吋αnceof preferences at each moment? 
And this directly leads to the second point. We also have the 
corresponding problem related to benevolence: how to weigh the 
im知rtanceof one individual's preferences against another individual's 
preferences? These problems are analogous but independent， as Sidgwick 
c1early saw. But Hare seems to think these problems can be somehow 
solved in terms of universalizability， which 1 now realize is wrong. 
Although 1 was quite impressed by Hare's preceding argument， 1 always 
felt uneasy about his step from particular preferences to the final 
preference ぐprefertenceal told ')for choosing an ‘ought¥judgment. There 
is the problem of‘correct representation' of another person's preferences 
(or of one's own at different times)， in the first place. This problem seems 
quite analogous to the measurement of length， which has to postulate a 
unit of length and a definition of congruence at dψ'erent locatioηs; it does 
not make sense to postulate the existence of the absolute. length， 
independent from these postulates. In our preference case， we have to 
have， likewise， criterion for telling whether this preference is the same 
as， or greater than， another preference， in strength， if two are not 
contemporaneous within oneself， or if two belongs to different 
individuals. Intrapersonal comparison， as well as interpersonal 
comparison， depends on such a criterion. Hare is aware of this， when he 
says:‘We imaginatively suppose that we could have the choice of having 
one of these experiences or the other， and from a preference now' (Hare 
1981， 125); thus introducing the present (informed) preference as the 
criterion of the comparison (for a c1earest statement of Hare's problem， 
see Giffin 1988. 76勺.
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*Griffin 1988. 76: 
Suppose 1 know a lot about your experiences. 1 can correct1y， fully， 
even vividly， represent them to myself. But my being able to 
represent to myself the feel of your experience is， in a way， too 
much of a good thing. It leaves me with one perception of the feel of 
my own experience and a second perception of the feel of yours. 
There is stil a gap. How do 1 get the two experiences on to one 
scale? 
Hare has provided a more systematic statement on this point: 
The problem of ordinality versus cardinality is more difficult. On the face 
of it it looks as if our method does not require us to be able to measure 
utilities in constant units or with a constant zerto point. For it is enough if 1， 
who am making a moral decision by critical thinking， can say ‘Jones prefers 
outcome 1 to outcome 12 more than Smith prefers outcome S2 to outcome Sl'. 
We do not have to be able to say how much more. This is because in our 
method of critical thinking we are not summing utilities， but， from an impartial 
point of view， which treats Jones' and Smith's equal preferences as of equal 
weight， forming our own preferences between the outcomes. (Hare 1981， 123) 
But notice that， in this quoation， Hare is already assuming two 
things: First， we alreαdy know whether or not a preference of Jones' is 
equal (in strength) to a preference of Smith's; Secon止weform our own 
preference from an impαγtial point 01 view. If we wish to provide a 
criterion of interpersonal comparison of preferences， the Firstちegsthe 
弓uestion.And the Second seems to be nothing but a restatement of 
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Sidgwick's Principle of Rational Benevolence， although it is formulated in 
terms of preferences. Recall that， according to Sidgwick， ifwe treat one's 
own good impartially through time， it is the Principle of Prudence 
(Rational Self-Love)， and if we treat different persons's good impartially， 
that is the Principle of Benevolence (and let me add that Sidgwick's 
notions of good and pleasure already incorporate preferences; see 
Sidgwick 1907， 110-1，127ワ.
*Sidgwick 1907，110-1: 
It would seem then， that if we interpret the notion 'good' in 
relation to‘desire'， we must identify it not with the actually desired， 
but rather with the desirable: --meaning by ‘desirable' not 
necessarily 'what ought to be desired'ちutwhat would be desired， 
with strength proportioned to the degree of desirability， ifit were 
judged aUainable by voluntary action， supposing the desirer to 
possess a perfect forecast， emotional as well as intellectual， of the 
state of attainment or fruition. 
*Sidgwick 1907， 127: 
but， for my own part， when 1 reflect on the notion of pleasure， --
using the term in the comprehensive sense which 1 have adopted， to 
include the most refined and subt1e intellectual and emotional 
gratifications， no less than the coarser and more definite sensual 
enjoyments， - the only common q uality that 1 can find in the 
feelings so designated seems to be that relation to desire and 
volition expressed by the general term “desirable"， in the sense 
previously explained. 1 propose therefore to define Pleasure-
w hen we are considering its “strict value" for purposes of 
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quantitative comparison --as a feeling which， when experienced by 
intelligent beings， is at least implicit1y apprehended as desirable or 
--in cases of comparison --preferable. 
As Hare himself mentions after the preceding quotation， cardinal 
(quantitative) utility is obtained if we accumulate enough (infinite， 
thoug的 preferences‘And，further， let us notice that Hare spells out the 
content of this impartiality， in his reply to Griffin in Seanor and Fotion 
(1988)， as follows: 
They linformed preferences] are formed ‘from scratch . . . from an 
understanding of the 0むjects before us'. With this 1 agree; but (..) 
‘understanding' means understanding of their nature， not of their objective or 
general1y accepted value; and though the judger judges from his own particular 
point of view， the exclusion of appeal to his own antecedent preferences or 
values means that any judge who truly represented to himself the situations-
cum-preferences would form the same order of preference. This order of 
preference is thus objective in the sense that al rational informed judges， 
judging from a universal point of view which excludes their own other 
preferences， will share it. (Hare 1988， 238) 
Notice how close Hare comes to Sidgwick in the last part of this 
quoation. In a word， ifwe have full informatIon and form a preference， 
excluding our own personal preferences， that's a preference from an 
impartial point of view， and it is the same 10γ everyone with the same 
conditions. 1 just wonder where Hare has established that this in fact 
holds! 1 cannot agree with him that ‘the exclusion of a予pealto his own 
antecedent preferences or values means' that everyone has the same 
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ordering; this is not a proof， but merely an assumption. 
It is of course permissible to call this impartiality (with respect to 
preferences) another kind of universalizability. But as 1 have already 
pointed out by analogy to the measurement of length， this new kind of 
universalizability is concerned with new concepお i.e.the strength of 
preference， which enables us to compare different people's preferences 
(assuming， for the sake of argument， that the strength is somehow 
ascertained)， clearly distinct from the Principle of Justice or from ‘the 
same facts， the same Ought' sort of principle. In forming our preferences 
(i.e. preferences al told) in critical thinking， itis logically possible to 
assign a different weight to my own or to other's preferences (that's why 
Hare has to mention ‘an impartial point of view'); even if 1 represent 
other's preferences by my own (which is the job of the Conditional 
Reflection Principle)， 1 can stil distinguish them from my original 
preferences (noticethat Hare is assuming Archangelic knowledge in 
critical thinking) so that it is up to me with what weight 1 should treat 
them. Harsanyi is quite clear about this when he discusses thε 
‘conversion rations' (between different utility functions) when we form a 
social-welfare function from individual utility functions (Harsanyi 1977， 
57). Even if each individual has a cardinal utility function， one's unit of 
utiliち， may be different from another's， and that's why we need coversion 
rations for a social-welfare function.持oticethat such ratios amount to 
weights of preferences. Thus， whether we call the impartiality in 
司uestion 'universalizaちility' or ‘benevolence' or whatever， the fact 
remains that it is non-tautological and needs substantive justifiεation; 
you may attribute it to the concept of morality， but then the question 
‘why should we be moral ?' becomes heavier and nothing is improved. 
In short. even if we allow Hare to assume the ‘correct 
-142-
r ; i t , t erel pti n.
t f r r issi l ll i partialit (with ct
s) t f iversalizabilit . ut I
i t eas r ent f , i i f
i ersali abili it ts, . t f
e , hi l par i t eople' r s
assum ng, f g e t, t e t IS
n , i t t rom ri i l f sti r rom 't
a , a ' rt f ri ci le. i r r s
. ll ) ri l n n , t i all ssi l
i t ei t r t er' r t'
ar enti ' parti l i t f i '); f I r t
t er' i f onditi al
efl t ri i l , I till i in i hem rom ri i al
t t t ar u i rchangeli l
l ) t t it hat ei ht I l t
h . ar i it r t i h i he
' er s' tw i t til ct s) h rm
i el t rom al til t ars yi ,
). f l r i al til t , e's nit f
tility i t rom t er' , ' ersi
io i elf cti . N t t t ount
ei t f es. , het er a l partialit I
q o 'u r l b ' r ' evolence' r hat , t
ai t t n-t t l i al st t sti c t ;
ib t t f orali , t est
' l oral ' e vi r t pr ved.
rt, f low ar u ' rr ct
representation' of others' preferences， including the strength of these 
preferences， he has to face the following dilemma: Either (1) the strength 
of each individual's preference does not have a common scale or unit， or 
(2) it has; but if (1)， Hare cannot meaningfully talk about an impartial 
treatment of everyone's preferences， and if (2)， he stil has to assume a 
unique way to assign a weight to each individual， i.e. the impartial 
weight， which cannot be justified on logical grounds alone. Further， ifin 
case (2)豆aretries to derive the impartial weight from ratio陶 liか， Hare is 
no different from Sidgwick. 
8. Conclusion 
Thus， 1 have to conclude that Hare， even for his simplest model case， 
has to assume analogues of all the three principles of Sidgwick. First of 
al， Hare's strong universalizability is non-tautologous and as strong as 
Sidgwick's Principle of Justice. Secondly， Hare's re弓uirement of 
impartiality through time with respect to one's own preferences is nearly 
as strong as Sidgwick's Principle of Prudence; 1 say ‘nearly' because 
Hare is not explicit1y committed to a quantitative notion of good or 
utility. but the requirement of equal weight to the strength of each 
preference is quite distinct from the universalizability of‘ought' or any 
other evaluative words. This holds even if we pass over the problem of 
representing preferεnces at other moments now. Thirdly and finallyラ the
requirement of equal weight to the strength of one's and other's 
preferences in critical thinking is also nearly as strong as Sidgwick's 
Principle of Benevolence， with the analogous proviso， applying to the 
representation of other's preferences within oneself. Briefly， itis one 
thing to represent other's preferences in oneself (by the Conditional 
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まeflectionPrincIple， which I did not question， for the sake of argument， 
in this paper)， and it is弓uiteanother thing to treat them e弓uallyor 
impartially; the latter amounts to an essential evaluative priciple for 
Sidgwick's utilitarianism. 
Hare's use of the word 'universalizaちility'has tended to concεal 
these problems under the name of 'logic¥Reading Sidgwick anew， I came 
to this conclusion. However， since Hare's method of justification of moral 
judgment still seems clearer than Sidgwick's intuitionist way (though he 
adds some elaboration in Sidgwick 1879)， I do not mean to abandon 
Hare's method altogether; only we need to notice where we are assuming 
substantive principles. 
Note: Although my interpretation of Sidgwick's three principles and my 
criticism of Hare's theory based on it are original (it occurred to me during the 
summer of 1997， and was communicatedもrieflyin the Sidgwick Mailing List， 
early September)， Mariko Okuno has already written， on my suggestion， 
another version utilizing the same ideas in her Ph.D. Thesis; she named the 
interpretation ‘じchii-Okuno Interpretation' giving the main credit to me. 
Although 1 am happy with this name， and agree with most of what she says， 1 
did not use that name in this paper. However， 1 wish to acknowledge that 1 had 
the benefit of examining her thesis and learning a great deal from her analysis 
of Sidgwick's view beforε1 prepare this paper; and 1 wish to thank her for 
helpful comments on this paper. For her version， see Okuno 1998b， 7.2 and 
9.3. She has also argued for the significance of Sidgwick's hedonism; see 
Okuno 1998a and 1998b. 10.1-10.4. 
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